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The flexibility of behavioral control is a testament to the brain’s capacity for dynamically
resolving uncertainty during goal-directed actions. This ability to select actions and learn
from immediate feedback is driven by the dynamics of basal ganglia (BG) pathways.
A growing body of empirical evidence conflicts with the traditional view that these
pathways act as independent levers for facilitating (i.e., direct pathway) or suppressing
(i.e., indirect pathway) motor output, suggesting instead that they engage in a dynamic
competition during action decisions that computationally captures action uncertainty.
Here we discuss the utility of encoding action uncertainty as a dynamic competition
between opposing control pathways and provide evidence that this simple mechanism
may have powerful implications for bridging neurocomputational theories of decision
making and reinforcement learning.
Keywords: basal ganglia, reinforcement learning, decision making, diffusion model, exploration-exploitation
tradeoff, speed-accuracy tradeoff
INTRODUCTION
Consider the scenario of being presented with a plate of cookies. You first grapple with the decision
as to whether or not you even want a cookie, depending on your fortitude at maintaining dietary
goals. After a brief deliberation you decide to make an exception to your diet and start to reach
toward the plate, however during the reach you realize that what you thought was a chocolate chip
is in fact a spider resting on top, prompting you to reactively cancel yourmovement. The experience
of seeing the spider also impacts the certainty that you will reach for a cookie in the near future,
making you more cautious and increasing your chances of sticking to your diet. This adaptability
of both proactive (i.e., breaking your diet) and reactive (i.e., responding to the spider) behavioral
control, in the face of multiple sources of uncertainty, is one of the most evolutionarily important
functions of the mammalian brain.
Several lines of evidence point to a central role of cortical and basal ganglia (BG) circuits
in modifying action decisions in dynamic environments; however, the mechanisms by which
cortico-BG pathways encode uncertainty and adapt with experience remains controversial. This
controversy is fueled by a history of often inconsistent and sometimes paradoxical experimental
findings. Central to this debate is the canonical model of the BG (Albin et al., 1989; DeLong,
1990), where action selection is determined by the dynamics of three separate control pathways
(Figure 1A): the direct pathway (Figure 1A; green) that facilitates motor output, the indirect
Dunovan and Verstynen Adaptive Decision-Making in Basal-Ganglia
FIGURE 1 | Architecture of cortico-BG pathways and hypothesized functional models. (A) Cortico-BG pathways including three major inputs to the striatal
direct (green), indirect (blue) pathways, and the subthalamic hyper-direct (red) pathway. Bridging collaterals (green, dotted) connect the direct pathway to the indirect
pathway via projections to the GPe. The arkypallidal pathway (orange) sends inhibitory feedback projections from the GPe to the striatum. Both the direct pathway
(cortex-striatum-GPi) and “short” indirect pathway (cortex-striatum-GPe-GPi) form focused projections throughout the network corresponding to individual action
channels. The “long” indirect pathway (cortex-striatum-GPe-STN-GPi) and hyper-direct pathway (cortex-STN-GPi) deliver diffuse excitatory inputs to the output
nucleus. (B) Independent Levers Model (i.e., the canonical model) assumes that the direct (left, green), indirect (middle, blue), and hyper-direct (right, red) pathways
are structurally and functionally segregated. Each pathway is operated in isolation for facilitating, suppressing, or braking motor output in the BG. (C) Pulley
Competition Model (i.e., Believer-Skeptic) assumes that the direct and indirect pathways compete throughout the BG (see Section Introduction), with the strength of
each pathway acting as weights on opposing sides of a pulley. As activation in the direct pathway overpowers that of the indirect pathway, this imbalance accelerates
the network toward “facilitation,” resulting in an executed action when the difference reaches a critical threshold (dotted line). In the event of a stop cue, the action can
be reactively canceled if the pulley brake (red brake pad) is activated before the direct-indirect difference reaches a critical threshold. The accelerating (e.g., nonlinear)
dynamics of an imbalanced pulley lead to less efficacious braking when the network is pulled further toward action execution (e.g., longer brake streaks on pulley
wheel). This dependency illustrates how proactive modulation of the direct-indirect balance may influence reactive stopping via activation of the hyper-direct pathway.
pathway (Figure 1A; blue) that suppresses motor output, and
the hyper-direct pathway (Figure 1A; red) that mediates fast
cancelation of sub-threshold motor decisions. According to the
canonical model, all three pathways act as independent decision
processes that regulate subsequent thalamic output to cortex
(DeLong, 1990).
The architecture of the BG is such that each control
pathway converges on a common output nucleus, suggesting
that at some level these pathways may interact. Indeed recent
electrophysiological (Mallet et al., 2012; Cui et al., 2013; Kress
et al., 2013; Cazorla et al., 2014), neuroimaging (Chikazoe et al.,
2009; Jahfari et al., 2011, 2012), computational (Bahuguna et al.,
2015; Dunovan et al., 2015; Gurney et al., 2015; Wei et al., 2015),
and behavioral (Verbruggen et al., 2014) findings have cast doubt
on the traditional independent process framework, in favor of a
dependent process model where all three pathways compete for
control over motor output. These observations allude to a novel
reconceptualization of the BG where the competitive dynamics
between all three pathways reflect a weighted combination of
learning and decision variables (Cazorla et al., 2014; Bahuguna
et al., 2015; Dunovan et al., 2015; Gurney et al., 2015; Wei
et al., 2015). This provides a theoretically valuable premise for
characterizing BG involvement in adapting actions in uncertain
environments.
Here we explore the computational utility of a dependent
process model of BG pathways. This review is partitioned into
three sections. First, we provide an in depth summary of current
debates regarding the role of the BG in inhibitory control.
Next, we discuss recent advances relating computational models
of decision-making and reinforcement learning to activity in
cortico-BG networks. Finally, we propose a framework for
synthesizing control, decision making, and learning within BG
circuits, arguing that these pathways are best characterized by
their ability to integrate uncertainty into goal-directed actions.
Interactions between Direct and Indirect
Pathways
According to the canonical BG model, in the cookie scenario
described above the decision to reach for the cookie is driven by
cortical activation of the direct pathway, whereas the decision to
abstain is driven by activation of the indirect pathway. These two
control signals are traditionally thought to occur in isolation of
one another, such that upstream cortical regions either facilitate
actions by activating the direct pathway or suppress actions
by activating the indirect pathway (Hikida et al., 2010). More
recently, the canonical model has been revised to include a
third “hyper-direct” pathway in which cortical excitation of the
subthalamic nucleus (STN) applies strong, diffuse suppression of
action-facilitating signals in the direct pathway when a cue to
stop (e.g., spider) is detected in the environment. This pathway
is thought to race against action facilitating signals in the direct
pathway in order to cancel an inappropriate or unnecessary
action (Aron and Poldrack, 2006). Together the dynamics of
the direct, indirect, and hyper-direct pathways form the basic
building blocks of behavioral control through BG pathways.
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The canonical BG model fundamentally assumes that all
three control pathways run in parallel to each other and do
not interact. Thus, the direct and indirect pathways may be
viewed as two independent levers that are recruited in order to
select appropriate actions that are in line with current behavioral
goals (Figure 1B). This is often referred to as “proactive”
control (Braver, 2012). The hyper-direct pathway also acts as
an independent lever, but one that is recruited “reactively”
upon detection of an environmental stop cue rather than
endogenous goals (Aron and Poldrack, 2006). That is, the hyper-
direct pathway acts as a safety brake for situations that require
late action cancelation, whereas the indirect pathway serves to
selectively suppress actions that conflict with the current goals.
The notion that cortico-BG pathways operate as independent
control mechanisms during action selection is reinforced by
a large body of evidence demonstrating their opposing effects
on motor output (see Albin et al., 1989 for review of basal
ganglia motor circuitry and Calabresi et al., 2014 for an updated
view). Recently, Kravitz et al. (2010) showed that optogenetic
stimulation of direct pathway medium spiny neurons (dMSN)
facilitated locomotor behavior in mice, whereas stimulation
of indirect pathway MSN’s (iMSN) led to motoric freezing.
This was interpreted as strong evidence for the existence of
structurally and functionally separate pathways for facilitating
and suppressing movement. In contrast with the findings of
Kravitz et al. (2010) a recent study by Cui et al. (2013) showed
that both direct and indirect MSNs in the mouse dorsal striatum
increase their firing just before contraversive movements. These
findings provide the first clear evidence of a long theorized
(Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Mink, 1996), but empirically
unfounded, action selection mechanism in the BG whereby
cortical projections activate the direct pathway of a target
action while simultaneously activating the indirect pathway of
competing actions. Intuitively, this form of “center-surround”
selection (Mink, 1996) becomes increasingly advantageous when
there aremany alternative actions fromwhich to choose, acting as
a safeguard against co-expression ofmultiple, interfering outputs.
In this context, the observation that direct and indirect pathways
are activated in unison marks an important discovery, but one
that is still consistent with the independent levers model. Both
pathways retain the same opposing influence over motor output
and are operated independently and exclusively within each
action channel. In contrast with this view, however, goal-directed
learning coincides with bidirectional plasticity at cortico-striatal
synapses, increasing the excitability of dMSNs while suppressing
the excitability of iMSNs (Shan et al., 2014). This would suggest
that, rather than behaving as independent levers (Figure 1B),
the direct and indirect pathways act as weights on opposing
sides of a pulley that bias the network toward a more facilitating
or suppressing state for a given action (Figure 1C). Over the
course of learning, more weight is added to the direct pathway of
sensorimotor mappings that yield positive results whereas weight
is added to the indirect pathway of aversive mappings (discussed
in detail in SectionDopaminergicModulation of Believer-Skeptic
Balance). This competitive balance also interacts with the efficacy
of the hyper-direct pathway, acting as a safety brake on the pulley
that, if applied soon enough, can prevent the weight of the direct
pathway from overcoming the weight of the indirect pathway
(Figure 1C, right).
Architecturally there is ample evidence to suggest that BG
pathways interact with each other. Most notably, all three
pathways converge at the output nucleus of the BG, the internal
segment of the globus pallidus (GPi) in humans and substantia
nigra pars reticulata (SNr) in rodents. This region is generally
considered to represent the locus of determination for action
decisions. At rest the GPi tonically inhibits the thalamus, marking
an important property of BG circuitry in that the default state
of the network is motor suppressing. Thus, in order to elicit a
motor output, the direct pathway must sufficiently inhibit target
cells in the GPi in order to disinhibit the corresponding channel
in the thalamus, that “opens the gate” for the appropriate action
output (Mink, 1996). In situations requiring the inhibition of
an action, indirect and hyper-direct pathways prevent motor
output by strengthening pallido-thalamic inhibition so as to
override the action gating effects of the direct pathway. In the
canonical indirect pathway model, cortical inputs to striatal
iMSNs inhibit tonic firing of neurons in the external segment
of the globus pallidus (GPe), thereby suppressing motor output
by further disinhibiting outputs in the GPi (Figure 1A, short
indirect pathway) and enhancing excitatory output of the STN
(Figure 1A, long indirect pathway). Given that all three of the
major BG pathways show signs of convergence in the GPi (Smith
et al., 1998; Mathai and Smith, 2011), it is easy to see how they
could compete for a final decision output from the BG to the
motor thalamus. It is also worth noting that cortical inputs to
these pathways are not as segregated as previously thought. For
instance, both dMSNs and iMSNs receive convergent thalamic
(Huerta-Ocampo et al., 2013) and cortical inputs (Kress et al.,
2013; Wall et al., 2013; Haber, 2014). Although there is a
reliable tendency for prefrontal and frontal motor cortices to
innervate iMSNs and for sensory and limbic cortices to innervate
dMSNs (Wall et al., 2013), suggesting that there is some degree
of segregation of information depending on the source of the
cortical inputs.
In addition to the convergence of pathway inputs and outputs,
a growing body of evidence has emerged revealing pathway-
level interactions in the feedback loops mediated by distinct sub-
populations in the GPe. For instance, the GPe of the indirect
pathway has been shown to send feedback projections to the
striatum (Mallet et al., 2012) that synapse onto both major MSN
subtypes, as well as striatal fast-spiking interneurons, or FSIs
(forming up to 13,000 synapses each; Silberberg and Bolam,
2015). A recent study (Mallet et al., 2016) found that this feedback
pathway, termed the arkypallidal pathway (Figure 1A; orange),
was engaged on successful “stop” trials in a reactive control
task. The authors concluded that the arkypallidal pathway is
responsible for silencing descending motor commands in the
striatum, acting in parallel with hyper-direct “braking” of GPi
output to cancel a planned response. In stark contrast with
this conclusion, another study found that arkypallidal neurons
displayed the strongest activation during the execution, not
cancelation, of an action (Dodson et al., 2015). This is consistent
with computational studies proposing that arkypallidal feedback
could facilitate motor output by suppressing FSIs (Bahuguna
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et al., 2015) since FSIs preferentially target dMSNs over iMSNs
(Mastro et al., 2014).
Given that arkypallidal projections are known to innervate
both motor suppressing and facilitating populations (Silberberg
and Bolam, 2015), these seemingly discordant findings are
suggestive of a more modulatory role in action selection rather
than execution or cancelation, per se. In line with this assessment,
single unit recordings in the macaque GPe have revealed two
functionally distinct sub-populations that contribute to anti-
saccades in the countermanding task (Yoshida and Tanaka,
2016): one that decreases firing, consistent with the response of
prototypical indirect pathway neurons during selective action
suppression, and another that increases firing, rising maximally
before successful anti-saccades. One intriguing possibility is
this activity-increasing population represents activation of the
arkypallidal pathway by the excitatory inputs from the STN.
The resulting feedback into the striatum could facilitate rapid
activation of a previously unplanned response by suppressing
FSIs which preferentially silence dMSNs. Thus, despite having a
generally dampening effect on both MSN subtypes, arkpallidal
feedback would give dMSNs an advantage for responding
to strong channel specific input from cortex, unimpeded by
activation of that channel’s indirect pathway. This modulatory
mechanism is more parsimonious than the channel specific
activation and suppression mechanisms proposed by previous
studies and is consistent with the known diversity of striatal cell
types targeted by this pathway (Silberberg and Bolam, 2015).
Finally, there is one architectural feature that has explicitly
been shown to mediate an interaction between direct and
indirect pathways: a significant portion of dMSNs send bridging
collaterals to the GPe, acting as indirect pathway efferents
(Figure 1A, dotted green line; Wu et al., 2000). A recent study
by Cazorla et al. (2014) found that dMSN bridging collaterals
are proliferated by promoting indirect pathway activity via D2R-
upregulation in iMSN’s. The authors demonstrate through a
series of experiments how experience-dependent changes in
bridging collateral density alter the physiological and behavioral
dynamics associated with direct and indirect pathway activation.
In stark contrast with independent levers model, Cazorla et al.
(2014) found that optogenetic stimulation of the direct pathway
coincided with a moderate number of inhibited cells in the
GPe in control mice, demonstrating clear interaction between
direct and indirect pathways in normally developed animals.
Remarkably, this effect became more salient with the activity-
dependent proliferation of collaterals into the indirect pathway
and actually reversed the effect of the direct pathway activation
on behavior—suppressing locomotion rather than facilitating it.
One major implication of the Cazorla et al. (2014) study
is that frequently suppressed actions, such as those that
are costly or uncertain, become more difficult to execute
as cortical activation of the direct pathway is restricted
by proliferated dMSN collaterals into the indirect pathway.
This functional link between direct and indirect pathways
could potentially explain numerous conflicting findings in
electrophysiological and human neuroimaging studies. For
instance, both pathways, when stimulated in isolation, lead
to heterogeneous (increased and decreased) changes in the
firing of downstream GPi/SNr cells (Freeze et al., 2013),
whereas others (Kravitz et al., 2010) have demonstrated clearly
opposing behavioral effects following direct (e.g., facilitation) and
indirect (e.g., suppression) pathway stimulation. These seemingly
inconsistent findings can be reconciled by revising the canonical
model to incorporate cross-talk between the direct and indirect
pathways, either through direct-pathway bridging collaterals
or through arkypallidal feedback projections to the striatum.
Finally, human neuroimaging studies of response inhibition have
proposed that proactive control is singularly driven by cortical
activation of striatal indirect pathway (Majid et al., 2013). The
findings by Cazorla et al. (2014), in addition to many of the
findings discussed above, strongly caution against the notion
that proactive control arises from exclusive engagement of the
indirect pathway or that modulation of this control is limited to
cortical sources.
BELIEVER-SKEPTIC: ENCODING
UNCERTAINTY AS A DYNAMIC
COMPETITION
The studies discussed thus far provide evidence against the
independent lever model of cortico-BG pathways and instead
favor a model in which these pathways engage in a dynamic
competition: as activity increases in one of the pathways the
balance is upset and the network accelerates toward motor-
facilitating or motor-suppressing state. Seen in this light, this
direct-indirect competition represents a potentially important
decision-making mechanism whereby multiple sources of
uncertainty can be weighed and integrated before choosing
between potential actions. In this way, the direct–indirect
competition implements a decision by weighing the arguments
of a Believer (e.g., direct pathway) against those of a Skeptic
(e.g., indirect pathway). Because the default state of the BG is
heavily motor suppressing (Bahuguna et al., 2015), the burden
of proof falls on the Believer and thus actions are only executed
when the accrued evidence sufficiently reduces the Skeptic’s
uncertainty. Here, we show that the competition between the
direct and indirect pathways can be formalized by the dynamics
of a simplified neural network model of cortico-BG pathways
andmapped onto parameters of accumulator models of decision-
making. From this, we argue that the competitive nature of
cortico-BG pathways is a critical feature for encoding uncertainty
and adapting behavior in changing environments.
Competing BG Pathways Encode Decision
Uncertainty
Computational models of decision-making predominantly fall
within the broader class of accumulation-to-bound models, in
which a decision is computed by accumulating the evidence for
one choice over another until a threshold is met and a choice
can bemade.When deciding between two alternative hypotheses,
or choices, the optimal rate of accumulation and other decision
criterion for maximizing speed and accuracy is described by
the Drift-Diffusion Model (DDM; Ratcliff, 1978; see Ratcliff and
McKoon, 2008 for a review). Successful application of this model
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to a broad spectrum of behavioral phenomena has established
the DDM as the archetypal model of decision-making. By
fitting models to behavioral data, response-time and accuracy
measures are decomposed into hypothesized subcomponents of
their generative mechanism that are quantified by specific model
parameters. These parameters can then be used to extract or
predict neural activity related to individual subcomponents of
the decision process.While significant progress has beenmade by
leveraging stochastic accumulator models to aid in the prediction
and interpretation of data in experimental neuroscience, it
remains an open question at what level of neural processing
(i.e., single neurons, local circuits, networks) these parameters are
realized in the brain.
Studies investigating the neural basis of decision-making have
largely focused on frontal and parietal systems, following from
early observations that single-neurons in these regions appear to
display the same ramp-to-threshold characteristics as the DDM.
More recently, it has become clear that the neural processes
involved in decision-making are much more distributed than
previously thought, suggesting that decision variables are tracked
by populations of neurons (Park et al., 2014) at both the cortical
(Heitz and Schall, 2012, 2013) and subcortical (Ding and Gold,
2012b, 2013) levels. Indeed, mounting evidence points to the BG
as a critical part of the decision network, serving as a convergence
zone for contextual and sensory information prior to decision
commitment (Ding and Gold, 2012b; Nagano-Saito et al., 2012;
Yanike and Ferrera, 2014; Dunovan et al., 2015; Keuken et al.,
2015; Wei et al., 2015). Most of the cortical regions that have
been implicated in the evidence accumulation process send direct
projections into the BG (Haber et al., 1995; Draganski et al., 2008;
Averbeck et al., 2014; Verstynen, 2014; Jarbo and Verstynen,
2015), as do many other context- and performance-monitoring
regions (Haber et al., 1995; Forstmann et al., 2012; King et al.,
2012; Haynes and Haber, 2013). This convergence of cortically
distributed decision signals into the BG adds credence to the
growing body of evidence suggesting this network is critical for
imposing a threshold on accumulating decision evidence (Lo and
Wang, 2006; Forstmann et al., 2008; Bogacz et al., 2010; Cavanagh
et al., 2011; Mansfield et al., 2011; Bahuguna et al., 2015; Frank
et al., 2015; Wei et al., 2015).
It is important to note that, in contrast with the DDM-like
ramping of cortical accumulators, the neural implementation
of a decision threshold is unlikely to present in such a
straightforward manner (Simen, 2012; Heitz and Schall, 2013).
Changes in the decision threshold of the DDM can capture
decision-related computations that occur at various stages of
processing; for instance, a decrease in the DDM threshold can
describe the behavioral effects of indiscriminately increasing
the baseline of evidence for both alternatives prior to sensory
input. Furthermore, a shift in the baseline of evidence may
reflect priming in either low-level sensory regions, downstream
evidence accumulators, cortical and subcortical motor circuits,
or some combination of all of these domains. Indeed, Heitz and
Schall (2012, 2013) have shown in a series of computational
and electrophysiological studies that, behavioral adjustments
optimally explained by a change in decision threshold in
standard accumulator models arise from a combination of
parameter changes in the of neurons in the frontal eye fields
(FEF). According to these findings, the representation of the
decision threshold in standard accumulator models is best
thought of as an abstraction of more sophisticated network
dynamics underlying speed-accuracy tradeoffs. Therefore, it is
useful for the purposes of this review to clarify the meaning
of decision threshold in the abstract sense so as to distinguish
this meaning from the mechanism by which it is theoretically
modeled or neurally implemented. At a conceptual level, a
decision threshold can be thought of as the “switch” or “latch”
mechanism responsible for transitioning from an accumulation
state to an action execution state. In contrast to the notion of
a threshold as the “upper limit” or “criterion boundary” placed
on evidence accumulation, switches are dynamic processes
themselves and can be adjusted to be more or less sensitive to
perturbation.
Converging electrophysiological (Schall et al., 2011; Ding
and Gold, 2012a) and computational (Simen, 2012; Standage
et al., 2014) evidence suggests that competing populations of
neurons can implement a transition threshold in the presence
of sufficient nonlinearity in the competitive inhibition between
populations. For instance, Schall et al. (2011) proposed the gated-
accumulator model to account for the cross-inhibition between
target and distractor populations in the FEF. These authors
trained macaques to maximize reward by emphasizing the speed
or accuracy of their performance in a visual search task based
on a prior cue. Behavioral speed-accuracy tradeoffs were well
described by a traditional accumulator model allowing only
the threshold to vary across conditions. However, recordings in
choice-selective FEF neurons displayed simultaneous changes in
the baseline, onset, and rate of firing as a function of decision
policy. Consistent with this, Wei et al. (2015) recently showed
that competitive dynamics between the direct and indirect
pathways in a spiking neural network of the BG could be tuned
to strategically adjust the decision threshold. In their model,
changing the synaptic efficacy of indirect pathway output from
the striatum to the GPe effectively modulated the threshold at
which accumulating cortico-striatal inputs produced an action.
Thus, rather than manifesting as a change in the RT-locked
firing rate of cortical accumulators (as might be expected if
neural decision thresholds were implemented as in the DDM),
this model showed that BG circuitry can approximate the same
mechanism by modulating balance of the direct and indirect
pathways.
Similar in concept to the gated accumulator model, consider
the simple neural network shown in Figure 2A, that is
composed of two competing neural populations with recurrent
excitatory connections. The mutual inhibitory connections
between populations of direct and indirect units, in combination
with recurrent self-excitation, leads to a non-linear change in
the separation of their firing rates over time. The point in
time at which this separation occurs marks the “gate” in the
gated accumulator model. Network properties that promote
early gating correspond to a lower threshold in the traditional
DDM. That is, they both reduce allotted time for evidence
to be gathered. On the other hand, the effective threshold
can be “raised” by increasing the time constant of evidence
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FIGURE 2 | Believer-Skeptic framework and competition between the direct and indirect pathways in neural and decision space. (A) The direct (D) and
indirect (I) pathways are modeled as two competing (i.e., mutual inhibition) accumulators with recurrent self-excitation reflecting population attractor dynamics.
Selective input to the direct (Id) and indirect (Ii) pathways is weighted and summed with input from a modulatory (non-selective) population (Im) which controls the
baseline excitability of the network. (B) Network state plotted as a function of different ratios of direct and indirect pathway activation. Greater activation of the indirect
pathway leads to fast attraction toward a NoGo state (more blue, motor suppressing), whereas greater activation of the direct pathway attracts the network toward a
Go state (more green, motor facilitating). (C) Left panel: firing rates of direct (solid lines) and indirect pathways (dotted lines) plotted across time for different ratios of
input (Id:Ii ). Right panel: accumulation of decision evidence toward an execution threshold, reflecting the normalized difference of the direct and indirect pathways in
the left panel. High Id:Ii ratio accelerates the rate of evidence accumulation, leading to a fast “go” decision (green). As this ratio is reduced (bluish-green), weaker
attraction by the direct pathway manifests as a slower rate of accumulation, producing a “no-go” decision when evidence fails to reach threshold by a deadline (blue).
accumulation, reflected in the network as a delayed gate or more
gradual separation of competing population activity.
While the gated accumulator model was originally used to
capture activity in target and distractor populations of cortical
neurons (Schall et al., 2011), we propose that a similar threshold
mechanism is implemented by a competition between direct
and indirect pathways in the BG. In this reduced form of the
model, the respective strength of each pathway is determined
by several factors, including the amount of cortical input to
each population, the weight applied to those inputs (i.e., cortico-
striatal synaptic efficacy), and the overall excitability of the
network based on non-specific modulatory inputs. Thus, rather
than the two populations in Figure 2A representing target
and distractor stimuli, they represent a single action channel
composed of a Believer population that competes with a Skeptic
population for control over motor output. It is important to
point out that, in contrast with the specific subpopulations of
FEF neurons depicted in the gated accumulator, this general
attractor network is not meant to depict specific populations of
cells (i.e., dMSNs, iMSNs, etc.) or specific projections between
or within BG nuclei (i.e., arkypallidal pathway, branching
collaterals, etc.,). Rather, we have opted to focus on the
implications of within-channel competition between motor-
facilitating and suppressing dynamics at the network level. Thus
we are sacrificing certain physiological details for the sake of
tractability in relating these dynamics to behavior. Co-activation
of direct and indirect pathways within a given action channel
has been proposed by previous models of BG pathways (Brown
et al., 2004; Schroll and Hamker, 2013; Wiecki and Frank, 2013);
however, strong empirical evidence for this competition is limited
to recent electrophysiological studies. This may be due, in part,
to the fact that dMSN and iMSN’s are often not distinguished
in single-unit studies of decision-related activity in striatum
(Ding and Gold, 2010, 2012b, 2013). Still, recent confirmation
that both pathways are active prior to movement (Cui et al.,
2013) has largely been taken as evidence of a center-surround
action selection mechanism (Friend and Kravitz, 2014) where
the “go” lever of target channel is surrounded by the “no-
go” levers of competing channels. Converging lines of evidence
suggest that center-surround selection not only emerges from,
but also requires simultaneous recruitment of direct and indirect
pathways for each action. For instance, a recent computational
study found that both pathways must be active to a controlled
degree within all channels, otherwise no actions or too many
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actions are selected (Gurney et al., 2015). This contingency is
in line with the bidirectional reweighting of cortical inputs to
the direct and indirect pathways observed during the acquisition
of goal-directed behavior (Shan et al., 2014). Accordingly, we
propose that both pathways are activated for each individual
action, but to varying degrees such that the ratio of direct-
to-indirect activity is optimized during goal-directed learning.
Under this assumption, a center-surround mechanism can still
arise in which a target action enjoys a greater direct-to-indirect
ratio than surrounding actions. In fact, there is good reason
to think that actions are selected through a combination of
center-surround suppression and the action-specific balance of
facilitation and suppression. We elaborate more on this in the
following section.
Linking Neural Competition to
Accumulator Models
The Believer-Skeptic framework presented here proposes that
cortico-BG pathways implement a decision threshold as a
dynamic competition of action facilitating and suppressing
network states. While we propose this to be a more neurally
plausible mechanism of threshold implementation than that
presented in the DDM, this is not to say that model abstraction
in the DDM is not useful. In fact, it is necessary for developing
quantitative theories that can be meaningfully parameterized at
cognitive and behavioral levels of description. In order for these
models to be applied to neural data there must be an appreciation
for the mapping between cognitive parameters and the more
complex neural processes that they represent.
Within the standard DDM, “competition” is inherently
captured by the accumulating decision process where each
step up or down represents the instantaneous evaluation of
two competing hypotheses: an action decision and its null
alternative. In the context of basic perceptual decisions, stimuli
with high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) produce faster rates of
evidence accumulation toward a decision boundary, and are thus
recognized faster and more reliably than noisy stimuli. This is
an important point to emphasize, as the unidirectional change
in the speed and accuracy of decisions is what fundamentally
distinguishes a change in drift-rate from a change in the
decision threshold in the standard DDM. As hinted at earlier
the decision process can instead be reparameterized to reflect
different hypotheses regarding the neural processes responsible
for integrating contextual information with sensory evidence
(Standage et al., 2014). In the Believer-Skeptic framework,
contextual information and sensory evidence converge as
weighted cortico-striatal inputs to the direct and indirect
pathways of a single action channel (Figure 2A). The strong
recurrent dynamics within each pathway lead to bistability in
the network output (Figure 2B), an important property for
implementing a switch between two states. Even when the
weighted input to each pathway is comparable, small amounts
of noise can disrupt the balance enough to cause a state
transition given sufficient self-excitation. As a result, both
pathways initially increase their firing rate then diverge as
activation in one pathway supersedes and inhibits the other,
switching the network toward a “Go” or “NoGo” attractor
state (Figure 2B). Thus, rather than the sensory driven drift-
rate of the DDM, the moment-to-moment competition between
alternative hypotheses in the Believer-Skeptic framework is
driven by a weighted combination of contextual and sensory
information. This form of competition can be seen in Figure 2C,
in which Go-NoGo decisions are made by accumulating the
output (right panel) of the direct-indirect competition (left panel)
under different levels of contextual uncertainty. When action
uncertainty is low, the network is accelerated toward a “Go”
state (Figure 2B) by stronger activation of the direct pathway,
causing a faster accumulation of decision evidence toward a
fixed execution threshold. Neurophysiologically, the fixed upper
threshold of decision evidence in Figure 2C (right plot) can be
conceptualized as the level of pallidal suppression necessary to
disinhibit the thalamus so that an action is executed.
We recently proposed a modified accumulator framework
motivated by the general control dynamics of the Believer-
Skeptic network in Figure 2, where action decisions are
executed by accumulating evidence toward a fixed threshold
in the presence of dynamic gain. In our so-called dependent
process model, we found that contextual information (i.e., cued
probability of reward) modulates the drift-rate of the execution
process (as seen in the right panel of Figure 2C). As action
uncertainty increases the drift-rate is suppressed, producing a
“no-go” decision when this suppression prevents the decision
process from reaching the execution threshold by the trial
deadline (Dunovan et al., 2015). Based on the apparent structural
overlap of BG pathways in the output nucleus (shown as
overlapping red, blue, and green fields in the GPi of Figure 1A),
we hypothesized that contextual modulation of competition
between direct (i.e., Go) and indirect (i.e., NoGo) pathways
should also influence the efficacy of the hyper-direct (i.e., Stop)
pathway during reactive action cancelation (Jahfari et al., 2010,
2011, 2012), Indeed, behavioral fits to RT and choice data in a
reactive stop-signal task favored a model in which contextual
suppression of the execution drift-rate improves the efficacy of a
nested but separate action cancelation process. Collectively, these
findings show how the contextual uncertainty associated with
a future action is not only critical for making a goal-directed
decision about executing that action, but also complements
the ability to reactively cancel it based on environmental
feedback.
This dependent process model also captured physiological
responses of BG pathways. By integrating the execution process
across the trial window, we were able to capture the duration
and magnitude of accumulating activity leading up to a decision.
Integrating the execution process in this way effectively collapses
the decision process into a single measure, similar to how the
blood oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal would filter the
neural activity generated by attractor network in Figure 2A.
Consistent with the behavioral fits, we found that contextual
modulation of the drift-rate was able to capture the pattern of
BOLD activity in the thalamus (the primary output target of the
BG pathways) during “go” and “no-go” decisions across varying
degrees of uncertainty. This finding is consistent with single-unit
recordings of neurons in the macaque motor thalamus which
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show a similar RT-dependent ramp in firing rate prior to action
execution (Tanaka, 2007; Masaki Tanaka and Kunimatsu, 2011).
One interpretation of this finding is that pre-action ramping
in the thalamus is driven by the differential activation of
upstream direct and indirect pathways and thus contextual
modulation of this signal occurs by changing the weights of
specific cortico-striatal connections or by altering background
excitability in the striatum. The hypothesis that the striatum
is where contextual information comes to bear on decision
evidence is often contrasted with the hypothesis that this is
accomplished by the thresholding function of the STN (Bogacz
et al., 2010). That is, a change in the slope of thalamic firing
rates could be due to decay in the hyper-direct activation of
the STN, allowing pallidal suppression by the direct pathway to
disinhibit the thalamus at a proportional rate. The distinction
between striatal and STN control over decision threshold is a
critical one (Bogacz et al., 2010), as these structures have very
different input-output motifs that hint at disparate functional
roles. The input-output organization of the striatum is thought
to be channel-specific, propagating individual action-commands
from cortex to corresponding units in the GPe (indirect) and
GPi (direct) segments. The STN, on the other hand, receives
converging afferents from cortex and the GPe and delivers diffuse
excitatory drive to the GPi, suggesting this structure modulates
the decision threshold in a non-specific manner for all actions
under consideration.
In fact, another hypothesis has been proposed for the role of
the STN in decision-making that both complements the role of
the striatum in the Believer-Skeptic framework and distinguishes
the functional relevance of indirect and hyper-direct activation
of the STN. Bogacz and Gurney (2007) presented a neural
network model in which the STN normalizes activity in the
GPi to accommodate different set sizes of alternative choices.
In their model, sensory evidence for each alternative is fed
into a corresponding action channel in the striatum in parallel
with projections that activate the STN. As a result, the cortico-
striatal activation within each individual channel of the GPi (i.e.,
representing candidate actions “A”, “B,” and “C,” for instance)
is represented as a proportion of the evidence for each action
relative to the total evidence for all actions under consideration.
This model describes the general increase in RT associated with
increasing the number of choices to be considered, indicative
of a global increase in the threshold for all possible outcomes
(Keuken et al., 2015). Another group found that removal of
the STN from the network had similar effects on choice RTs
as STN deep brain stimulation in treated Parkinson’s patients—
selectively eliminating the delay in RT for low-probability stimuli
(Antoniades et al., 2014).
The proposed thresholding and normalization functions of
the STN are complementary with the Believer-Skeptic framework
and can be dissociated from the hitherto-proposed role of the
direct and indirect competition as a mechanism for encoding
action uncertainty. The normalizing effect of STN output on
pallidal inhibition emerges naturally under the assumption that
all actions simultaneously engage both the direct and indirect
pathways. That is, individual action uncertainty is encoded by
the “short” indirect pathway from striatum to GPe and then to
channel-specific populations in the GPi (see Figure 1; Schroll
and Hamker, 2013) where the indirect pathway converges with
action facilitating signals of the direct pathway. On the contrary,
activation of the “long” indirect pathway, splitting off from GPe
to the STN, leads to widespread excitatory increase in GPi firing.
Under the assumption that both direct and indirect pathways
are active for each action being considered, the net activation
through the “long” indirect pathway has a normalizing effect on
the basal GPi state, accommodating varied set sizes of alternative
actions. Moreover, the relative uncertainty between actions is
preserved regardless of hyper-direct perturbation of STN in
the event of conflict detection. Increased hyper-direct activation
of the STN would sacrifice the optimality of the normalizing
constant it delivers to GPi, but only when that optimality is
challenged by unanticipated conflict.
While the long-indirect and hyper-direct pathways likely
play an important role in action selection, the within-channel
competition of the direct and (short) indirect pathways is
ultimately what determines which action is selected. For instance,
in the context of a forced-choice perceptual decision, the
transition between accumulation and execution is determined
by the relative activation of two alternative action channels,
each driven by a separate set of competing direct and
indirect populations. This process is shown in Figure 3, where
an observer must decide whether a noisy field of moving
dots contains greater coherent leftward or rightward motion.
Critically, a cue is displayed prior to each choice informing
the observer which outcome is more likely to be correct
on the upcoming trial. Previous work has shown that this
predictive information is encoded by a concurrent increase
in the baseline activity in the striatum, contralateral to the
expected action, and modulatory regions of cortex, such as
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and pre-supplementary motor area
(preSMA; Forstmann et al., 2010). When the cued probability
is valid (i.e., correctly predicts the subsequent stimulus;
Figure 3A) the increase in baseline activity of the corresponding
action channel causes the network to become more unstable,
leading to faster gating upon descending input from cortical
accumulators. However, when the cue is misleading or invalid
(Figure 3B), this destabilization in the cued action channel can
lead to an incorrect response despite weak sensory evidence
in favor of that choice. This speed-accuracy tradeoff is a
widespread phenomenon that pervades all forms of decision-
making. While numerous studies have found that functional
and structural connectivity between preSMA and the striatum
predicts individual differences in the speed-accuracy tradeoff
(Forstmann et al., 2010; van Maanen et al., 2011; Keuken
et al., 2014), the underlying mechanism by which modulatory
cortical inputs influence action selection in the BG has remained
unclear. The example here proposes one such mechanism
and highlights an important prediction of the Believer-Skeptic
framework, in which uncertainty associated with individual
actions is encoded by the competition between corresponding
direct and indirect pathways. Of course, this prediction will need
to be more rigorously tested, both experimentally and through
the use of more sophisticated computational models of BG
circuitry.
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In sum, the Believer-Skeptic framework provides a compelling
account for the role of the BG in decision-making, demonstrating
the computational utility for encoding action uncertainty in
the competition between the direct and indirect pathways. This
framework also provides a straightforward interpretation of the
different roles of striatal and STN modulation of the decision
process. Non-specific background inputs to the striatum can
adjust the speed-accuracy tradeoff in favor of quicker decision-
making by promoting faster state attraction in response to
input from sensory accumulators. Cortico-striatal mechanisms
may also modulate the decision in outcome-specific ways by
altering the balance of channel-specific activity in the direct
and indirect pathways. This interpretation is consistent with
human neuroimaging studies linking cortico-striatal activity
to the facilitation of one choice at the expense of choosing
another; for instance, by selectively increasing of the drift-
rate or baseline evidence for an expected outcome (Forstmann
et al., 2010; Dunovan et al., 2015). On the other hand, indirect
pathway activation of the STN provides a normalizing constant
to BG output by aggregating the activation of multiple action
channels into diffuse projections to the GPi, whereas hyper-direct
activation of the STN modulates the decision indiscriminately,
buying time in the interest of accuracy (Forstmann et al.,
2012; Frank et al., 2015). In the following and final section,
we elaborate on how Believer-Skeptic dynamics of decision-
making are complemented by the well-established role of the
cortico-striatal circuits in mediating Actor-Critic reinforcement
learning (RL).
BELIEVER-SKEPTIC MEETS
ACTOR-CRITIC
The idea that direct and indirect pathway competition may
be a mechanism for encoding action uncertainty has profound
implications not only for decision-making, but also for
reconsidering what exactly the BG learns. Feedback based
learning in BG pathways has been best described as an Actor-
Critic process (Sutton and Barto, 1998) where the values of
alternative actions are learned by trial-and-error comparison
of an action’s expected and observed values. The Actor learns
to select more valuable actions based on the feedback from
the Critic about the difference between expected and observed
rewards following an action. Thus, the critical learning signal
in RL models is quantified as a reward prediction error (RPE),
calculated as the difference between an action’s observed and
expected value. Evidence from human and animal studies has
consistently linked this form of learning to phasic modulation
of dopaminergic neurons in the substantia nigra pars compacta
(SNc) that send feedback signals to striatal direct and indirect
MSNs. When an action is followed by an unexpected reward
(i.e., a positive RPE), SNc neurons display a transient burst in
firing that scales with the RPE magnitude, causing proportional
influx of dopamine into the striatum. In contrast, the omission
of an expected reward (i.e., a negative RPE) cause a transient
pause in SNc firing, thereby reducing dopamine availability in
the striatum. Recent computational and experimental studies
have started to build a more complete picture of the interface
between controlled action decisions, as discussed in the previous
section, as well as better explicate the role of dopamine in flexibly
adapting goal-directed behavior. In the following section we
discuss a reconceptualized model of cortico-BG pathways at the
intersection of neurocomputational theories of decision-making
and RL.
Dopaminergic Modulation of
Believer-Skeptic Balance
Electrophysiological studies have consistently found a
relationship between the phasic activation of midbrain
dopaminergic neurons and the trialwise magnitude of RPEs that
mediate RL. For this dopaminergic RPE to be a viable learning
signal it must be capable of selectively encouraging rewarded
actions and discouraging unrewarded or punished actions. The
phasic increase in dopamine following a surprising reward
both sensitizes dMSNs and desensitizes iMSNs, making it easier
for cortical inputs to quickly execute that action in the future
(Wiecki and Frank, 2013; Hart et al., 2014). By the same token,
phasic dips in dopamine following the omission of an expected
reward offset the balance in the other direction, requiring
stronger or prolonged cortical input to gate the same action in
the future (Marcott et al., 2014; Bahuguna et al., 2015; Gurney
et al., 2015). The bidirectional effect of positive and negative
feedback on pathway-specific neural subtypes sheds light on the
utility of selecting actions with two opposing pathways instead
of a single facilitation pathway (Hart et al., 2014). Indeed, several
lines of evidence suggest that dopaminergic modulation of the
direct pathway is primarily driven by positive RPEs that facilitate
approach-learning, whereas the modulation of the indirect
pathway is primarily driven by negative RPEs, facilitating
avoidance learning (Frank et al., 2009; Hikida et al., 2013; Cox
et al., 2015).
In a series of computational experiments, Gurney et al.
(2015) recently provided a comprehensive description of the
interactions between tonic and phasic fluctuations in striatal
dopamine that guide goal-directed action selection. In their
neural network model, cortical input from competing sensory
populations is sent in parallel to all three cortico-BG pathways
representing the sensory-paired actions. Thus, when sensory
information is equivocal and cortical input leads to comparable
activation in different action channels, the history dependent
cortico-striatal weights are what critically determine which of the
two actions wins out in the selection process.
The synaptic tuning of these weights by positive and
negative RPEs can be naturally incorporated into the Believer-
Skeptic decision network shown in Figure 2A—by increasing
the sensitivity of the direct and indirect populations following
rewarded and punished actions, respectively. Over the course
of several trials, the feedback-dependent tuning of synaptic
weights leads to faster gating in the network and thus faster
rates of evidence accumulation in decision space for higher
valued actions. This is captured in Figure 4A where the model
gradually learns the relative value of alternative actions based on
probabilistic stimulus-reward contingencies from trial-and-error
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FIGURE 3 | Within-channel competition and top-down modulation of expectations during perceptual decision-making. (A) (Top) : schematic of cue and
stimulus epochs of random dot motion task on trial with valid predictive cue-stimulus combination. (Middle): schematic of decision network. Left (L, red) and right (R,
purple) motion-selective sensory populations gradually increase activity at a rate proportional to the strength of coherent motion in their preferred direction. Each
sensory population sends excitatory input to a corresponding pair of direct and indirect populations representing left- and right-hand actions for reporting leftward and
rightward motion decisions, respectively. Sensory inputs activate both pathways but with a bias favoring the direct pathway, reflecting the tendency for sensory inputs
to the striatum to form more connections with dMSNs than iMSNs (Wall et al., 2013). A modulatory population (M, gray) delivers non-selective excitatory input to the
pair of direct and indirect pathways encoding the anticipated action (i.e., action corresponding to the cue-predicted motion direction). (Bottom-upper): firing rates of
the direct (solid line) and indirect (dotted lines) populations for left- and right-hand actions. (Bottom-lower): accumulation of the difference between direct and indirect
firing-rates toward an execution threshold. The effect of cued expectations can be seen as an upwards shift in the baseline firing rates of the right-hand direct-indirect
network, reflecting anticipatory input from the modulatory population. This increases the excitability of the network, causing a faster separation in the direct-indirect
competition and a faster rise-to-threshold in the rightwards than leftwards decision variable, producing a correct response. (B) (Top): same task as in the left panel but
on a trial with an invalid predictive cue-stimulus combination. (Middle): same decision network as in the left panel but with modulatory input delivered to the left-hand
direct-indirect network as a result of cued expectations of a leftwards motion stimulus. (Bottom): same layout as in the left panel. The invalid expectation signal
destabilizes the direct-indirect competition, leading to a faster rise-to-threshold of the left-hand decision variable and an incorrect response.
feedback. Similar to the behavioral paradigm used by Frank
et al. (2004) the model is presented with a pair of stimuli and
must learn to select the stimulus with a higher probability of
yielding a reward. Each stimulus is converted into an action
by a corresponding pair of direct and indirect nodes that are
tuned by corrective feedback signals, simulating the effects
of dopaminergic RPE signals on dMSNs and iMSNs. Thus,
feedback sensitizes the direct pathway and suppresses the indirect
pathway for the optimal choice while shifting the balance in
the opposite direction for the alternative, converging on weights
that reflect the expected difference in their learned values. In
the accumulator model, this manifests as a drift-rate for each
stimulus proportional to its perceived value, leading to a stronger
choice bias when deciding between alternatives that are less
evenly matched in terms of their expected payout (Figure 4A).
Because in this example the stimulus-action-value
associations are probabilistic, a certain amount of exploration
is needed in order to optimize the estimated value for each of
the two stimuli. In Actor-Critic RL, exploratory dynamics are
usually facilitated by a single parameter that determines the
initial probability of going with the currently highest-valued
option. Here, however, exploration is naturally handled by the
stochastic nature of the direct-indirect competition during the
decision process. A recent study found that the RT distributions
of value-based choices in a perceptual learning experiment
were well described by a DDM in which the learned value
difference between alternative stimuli determined the drift-rate
of accumulation (Frank et al., 2015). This finding adds support to
the future hybridization of RL and decision models, suggesting
that the behavioral dynamics of value-based choices can be
systematically characterized by corrective modulation of a
stochastic rise-to-threshold process.
In addition to the phasic dopamine modulations responsible
for learning action-value associations, the level of tonic dopamine
availability in the striatum has recently been proposed to regulate
the tradeoff between exploratory and exploitative learning
policies (Humphries et al., 2012; Kayser et al., 2015). That
is, in order to maximize rewards in dynamic environments
(with changing response-outcome contingencies), one must
balance the time spent exploring the value of novel, potentially
high-payoff actions, and exploiting historically rewarding actions
(Humphries et al., 2012; Keeler et al., 2014). Put into the context
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FIGURE 4 | The effects of phasic and tonic dopamine on Believer-Skeptic competition. (A) Simulation of probabilistic value-based decision task (upper-left;
see Frank et al., 2004) in which the agent must learn the relative value of two arbitrary stimuli based on trial-and-error feedback. On each trial the agent makes a
decision by choosing between a pair of Japanese symbols, one with a higher probability of yielding a reward (left column; chosen with action aopt ) than the other (right
column; chosen with action asub). Value-based decisions are simulated as a race-to-threshold between two stochastic accumulators (see Figure 3), each reflecting
the direct-indirect competition within a single action channel (see Figure 2). Both actions start out with equal associated values Q(aopt ) = Q(asub) and thus, equal
drift-rates of accumulation. On each trial, the corrective effects of phasic changes in dopamine are simulated by enhancing (depressing) the sensitivity of the direct
(indirect) pathway following positive outcomes (+δ) and vice-versa following negative outcomes (−δ). In the accumulator model, this learning results in an increase in
the drift-rate for aopt (solid arrow) and a decrease in the drift-rate for asub (dotted arrow), proportional to the difference in their associated value. The bottom panel
shows the timeline of the estimated value difference for alternative actions (Q(aopt ) − Q(asub)) for three different probabilistic reward schedules. Stimulus pairs with a
greater discrepancy in reward probability (i.e., red > green > blue) lead to faster associative value learning. (B) Simulated effects of tonic dopamine levels on
exploration-exploitation tradeoff. Tonic dopamine levels were simulated by varying the strength of non-specific background inputs (Iλ) in a network with stronger
weighting of cortical input to direct than indirect pathway. (Bottom) panel: the same ratio of cortical input to the direct (green) and indirect (blue) pathways leads to
faster gating in the presence higher Iλ (darker colors, increased baseline) compare to when Iλ is low (lighter colors, decreased baseline). (Top) panel: Increasing tonic
levels of Iλ facilitates exploitation of the current cortico-striatal weights by accelerating evidence accumulation, resulting in faster decisions and reduced trial-to-trial
variability in RT. In contrast, behavior is substantially more variable with lower levels of Iλ, promoting an exploration policy.
of the Believer-Skeptic framework, explorative states can be
thought of as conditions in which the balance is tipped toward
the Skeptic such that all action possibilities are uncertain and
thus no single decision dominates. In contrast, exploitative states
are those in which the Believer dominates for a single decision,
resulting in faster and more precise decisions that preclude
alternative actions from being engaged.
Much of the current understanding of the interplay between
value-based learning mechanisms and exploitation-exploration
tradeoff policies has come from research on song-bird learning
(Brainard and Doupe, 2002; Kao et al., 2005). While research
on song-bird learning has progressed largely in parallel with the
studies of decision-making in the BG, it has been speculated
that the two fields are currently moving toward a mutually
beneficial junction (Ding and Perkel, 2014). Juvenile song-birds
initially learn to sing by mirroring the song of an experienced
tutor but over time compose an individualized version of the
song by sampling alternate spectral and temporal components
of vocalization (Tumer and Brainard, 2007). This is done
to improve reproductive success, as females tend to select
males with unique songs that can be performed repeatedly
with high precision. Recently Woolley et al. (2014) found that
when practicing in isolation, males express substantially more
variability in the spectral and temporal dimensions of song
vocalization than when in the presence of a mate. This contextual
alternation between exploring alternate song renditions during
practice and exploiting a favorite rendition led to systematic
differences in the variability of firing in the output of a region
called Area X, a homolog of the mammalian BG. The authors
proposed that social context led to changes in the tonic level
of dopamine available to neurons in the input structure of
Area X, similar to the striatum of the BG in mammals, which
impacted the amount of exploration or exploitation of the system.
Their hypothesis was supported by the observation that striatal
connections exhibit a many-to-one convergence onto target cells
in the BG output nucleus. Previous work suggests that given
this many-to-one motif, enhanced dopaminergic tone would
establish a more consistent average level of activation within a
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 11 March 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 106
Dunovan and Verstynen Adaptive Decision-Making in Basal-Ganglia
group of striatal units, thus increasing reliability of temporally-
locked bursts and pauses of recipient neurons in the output
nucleus (Goldberg et al., 2004; Costa et al., 2006).
Consistent with a dopaminergic regulation between
exploitative-explorative policies, several recent computational
modeling studies have found that the simulated effects of tonic
dopamine level have a marked impact on action variability
(Yawata et al., 2012; Klanker et al., 2013; Morita and Kato, 2014).
Increasing dopaminergic availability in the striatum leads to a
general “Go” bias in the network, due to the inverse effects of
dopamine on MSN subpopulations. Furthermore, higher tonic
dopamine levels also increases D1 and D2 receptor occupancy
so that RPE signals communicated by phasic bursts and pauses
in SNc fail to have the same impact on cortico-striatal plasticity
(Keeler et al., 2014). Thus, behavior is stabilized to promote
exploitation of previously learned associations by facilitating
BG throughput that reflects the present weighting scheme at
cortico-striatal synapses. In Figure 4B, the population firing
rates are shown for different decision policies, all reflecting
the same ratio of input to the direct and indirect pathways,
but with a change in background levels of tonic dopamine
(e.g., background excitation). Increasing dopamine reduces
the time constant of evidence accumulation such that learned
cortico-striatal weights can be exploited to rapidly accelerate
the network toward a “Go” state, with little variability in the RT
and outcome of the decision process (Figure 4B). Alternatively,
the same levels of cortical input leads to substantially greater
trial-to-trial variability in decision behavior when dopamine is
scarce, demonstrated by the widening of the RT distribution for
decisions made under lower levels of background dopamine.
When considered in the context of selecting from multiple
actions, the increase in action variability (i.e., wider RT
distribution) with reduced levels of tonic dopamine would
allow the agent to explore novel, potentially more rewarding,
stimulus-action associations. When a sufficiently rewarding
association is found or when there is a change in context that
demands precision, increasing background dopamine levels
would temporarily halt feedback-dependent plasticity to ensure
lower variability in performance.
The relationship between action variability and striatal
dopamine adds an interesting perspective to recent studies
showing how behavioral variability expands and contracts with
a subject’s learning rate, and seems to do so in a controlled,
systematic fashion. While standard RL models assume learning
rate to be a constant index of an individual’s inherent sensitivity
to feedback error, applying this assumption to human behavior
seems to be overly restrictive, especially in realistically dynamic
environments. It has been hypothesized, that in settings with
a high probability of experiencing a state change (i.e., change
in a previously learned stimulus-response-outcome mappings)
humans may deliberately amplify the uncertainty or perceived
risk of their surroundings so as to maximize adaptability
to new information (O’Reilly, 2013). Indeed, a recent study
by Wu et al. (2014) found that when learning to make
visually-guided and reward-guided reaching movements, human
subjects demonstrated a simultaneous increase in learning rate
with movement variability during times of greater uncertainty.
Incredibly, the authors found that the increase in motor
variability was not random, but was expressed along task-specific
dimensions, suggesting that variability is not only capitalized
on but is deliberately employed by the nervous system to
facilitate adaptation to relevant sources of error. In addition to
continuous motor control experiments like this one, discrete
choice experiments have found that variability in decision-
making strategically fluctuates with model-fit learning rates in
response to a shift in the statistics of a task or environment
(Nassar et al., 2012; Payzan-LeNestour et al., 2013; McGuire
et al., 2014). Franklin and Frank (2015) recently proposed a
candidate mechanism for adapting the rate of learning to changes
in uncertainty based on the modulatory influence of cholinergic
interneurons on striatal plasticity in BG model of decision
making. These tonically active (inter)neurons (TANs) are known
to exhibit a pause in firing in response to reinforcement
feedback following action execution. This pause in TAN activity
results in disinhibition of both dMSNs and iMSNs. Because
this pause is temporally concomitant with dopaminergic RPEs,
the resulting disinhibition of MSNs improves activity-dependent
plasticity and, in turn, the divergence of synaptic weighting in
optimal (↑direct, ↓indirect) and suboptimal (↓direct,↑indirect)
channels. A novel prediction of the model is that uncertainty
in the decision process can be estimated online based on
the entropy of MSN activity across action channels and over
time. The authors show that, under certain circumstances, the
reciprocal connectivity between striatal MSNs and TANs is
capable of dynamically adapting the learning rate to optimize
the exploration-exploitation tradeoff across varying degrees of
uncertainty. For instance, high entropic MSN activity leads to
longer TAN pauses, enhancing plasticity in the context of high
uncertainty (i.e., following rule reversal) to accelerate acquisition
of new associations. Future electrophysiological studies will be
needed to confirm the prediction that decision uncertainty
is somehow encoded by the firing activity of MSNs across
alternative action channels and that this population code plays
a role in optimizing plasticity during RL.
Human neuroimaging studies have also found evidence of
striatal involvement in learning rate adaptation. For instance,
a recent fMRI study found that activity in the caudate nucleus
dynamically tracks subjects’ learning rates, rising with greater
trial-wise volatility in choice difficulty across blocks of a Stroop
task (Jiang et al., 2015). The authors found that the volatility-
driven changes in caudate activation resulted from descending
control signals in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), updating
the predicted level of control needed on the upcoming trial.
One intriguing explanation for this finding is that exploratory
dynamics in the striatum are mediated by different sources
depending on the dimension of exploration: i.e., relying on
modulatory cortical inputs to facilitate control-based exploration
and tonic dopamine levels to facilitate value exploration (Woolley
et al., 2014). Of course, this mechanism is only speculative
and future studies investigating the mechanisms of control-
and value-based exploration will need to draw on evidence
from both animal models as well as human neuroimaging
experiments. Neuroimaging experiments in particular could be
poised to investigate this question by comparing the functional
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connectivity between cortical regions, such as ACC and preSMA,
and the striatum across conditions in which task performance
relies on state-change detection of stimulus-control or stimulus-
value associations. Furthermore, pharmacological manipulations
could be employed to determine if value-based exploration is
selectively impaired by increasing tonic dopamine availability.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The emerging evidence on the organization of and interactions
between BG pathways highlights the limitations of the
canonical model of parallel and independent pathways.
While the canonical model continues to provide a valuable
benchmark for evaluating advancements in the understanding
BG function, recent evidence suggests that competition between
BG pathways has profound implications for understanding
the BG’s role in decision making and learning. Here, we
have presented an overview of recent experimental and
computational evidence for a reconceptualized view of cortico-
BG pathways, highlighting three central themes: (1) the
direct and indirect pathways engage in competition during
action selection, acting as weights on a pulley, rather than
independent facilitation and suppression levers, (2) this
competition is critical for integrating contextual uncertainty
(i.e., Skeptic) with accumulating evidence (i.e., Believer) during
decision making, and (3) this competitive dynamic lays the
foundation for a rich, flexible behavioral repertoire when
combined with the dopaminergic modulation described by
Actor-Critic RL theories. Based on these findings we have
outlined a conceptual framework for the decision-making
computations embedded in the competition between the
direct and indirect pathways. We feel that this Believer-
Skeptic framework offers an appealing first step toward
synthesizing neurocomputational theories of decision making
with Actor-Critic models of RL.
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